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A Reaction to Systematic Inaction:
Breaking the Congressional Logjam
Where It Counts
Nicholas W. Archibald
I.

Introduction
In creating the U.S. Constitution, Federalists were
weary of a government’s ability to rule tyrannically over its
people, and so decided to turn the government against itself
because “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition.”1
Publius further argued “the great security against a gradual
concentration of the several powers in the same department[]
consists in giving to those who administer each department
the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to
resist encroachments of the others.” 2 Conflict within the
government would ensure that energy that could be
expended oppressing the people would be focused on
maintaining power vis-à-vis the various branches. 3
Congress too was originally structured with some conflict

1

THE
FEDERALIST
NO.
51
(James
Madison),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp.
2
Id. Publius was the pen name James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John
Jay used when authoring the Federalist Papers advocating for the new U.S.
Constitution. John Kincaid, Publius: Journal of Federalism, LAFAYETTE
COLL., https://meynercenter.lafayette.edu/publius-journal/ (last visited Dec. 21,
2020).
3
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1 (“A dependence on the people is, no
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by
opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced
through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see
it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the
constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as
that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual
may be a sentinel over the public rights.)
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and slowness in mind.4 The Federalists proposed structuring
Congress specifically to be deliberative, knowing
“impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into
measures which itself, on maturer reflection, would
condemn.”5 This article does not question the efficacy of the
Federalists’ arguments for separation of powers and
cautioning against haste in decision-making, but rather
questions if this sound counsel is working in the American
peoples’ best interests. Specifically, has the legislature
reached a point where it can no longer cooperate with the
President? Furthermore, has partisan rancor unreasonably
paralyzed the legislature itself?
This paper answers in the affirmative.
Congressional inaction undoubtedly comes with substantial
costs to our republic.6 The issue is hardly new.7 While these
4

THE
FEDERALIST
NO.
73
(Alexander
Hamilton),
https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper25493465.
5
Id.; see also Jeff Jacoby, Gridlock, or Democracy as Intended?, BOSTON
GLOBE
(Dec.
25,
2011,
9:43
PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2011/12/25/gridlock-democracyintended/EJlqriPsRHqeW9wxlAhtMK/story.html (arguing the gridlock seen in
modern-day politics is still working as the Framers of the Constitution intended);
Michael J. Gerhardt, Why Gridlock Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107,
2110 (2013) (arguing for a more nuanced view of gridlock and that “both
protestations about gridlock and the praise for it are overdone.”). While this
article does not intend to attack legislative gridlock or debate its merits, it still
must be recognized, as Gerhardt writes, that “the purpose of the Constitution is
not merely to allow gridlock.” Gerhardt, supra, at 2108.
6
See Jacob Pramuk, Coronavirus Stimulus Stalemate Could Drag on for Weeks
as
Congress
Leaves
Town,
CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/13/coronavirus-stimulus-updates-pelosi-saysno-talks-scheduled-with-white-house.html (last updated Aug. 14, 2020, 10:05
AM) (illuminating the hardships many Americans faced due to Congress’
inability to reach a deal on a COVID-19 relief package); see also, e.g., Shelley
Ross Saxer, Paying for Disasters, 68 U. KAN. L. REV 413 (2020) (discussing
the costs of natural disasters as a result of government inaction and proposing
holding the government liable in tort to motivate future preventative measures).
7
See Evan Thomas, The Government Response to Katrina: A Disaster Within
a Disaster, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 18, 2005, 8:00 PM EDT),
https://www.newsweek.com/government-response-katrina-disaster-withindisaster-118257 (highlighting the lack of coordination and long process ahead
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costs (such as presidential administrations’ inability to
appoint agency officials) are not always visible to the
average American, citizens may nonetheless feel the effects
thereof.8 A more visible symptom of Congress’ dysfunction
in the way of appointments is the rising controversy
surrounding nominations to the Supreme Court. 9 Federal
in terms of investigations as well as describing the government’s failure to act
in a unitary fashion); Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Disaster Aid Package Derailed
by Lone Republican Lawmaker—Again, CBS NEWS (May 28, 2019, 1:33 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/disaster-relief-bill-house-will-try-again-topass-aid-package-derailed-by-lone-republican-congressman/
(illustrating
Representative Chip Roy’s opposition to a Puerto Rico relief bill due to a lack
of a roll call vote and border security funding, which contributed to paralyzing
Congress’ ability to provide relief for the U.S. territory). The problem can be
traced as far back as the nineteenth century. See William P. Marshall, The
Limits on Congress’s Power to Do Nothing: A Preliminary Inquiry, 93 IND. L.J.
159, 168 n.59 (2018).
8
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency
Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 920 (2009) (“[V]acancies promote agency
inaction. Agencies without confirmed officials in key roles will be less likely to
address important problems and less equipped to handle crises.”). With the
increasing procedural delays in confirming nominees, it is likely that the
consequences O’Connell wrote about in her article have and will continue to
come to pass with greater force. See Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, The
Senate’s Record-Breaking Gridlock Under Trump, POLITICO (June 8, 2020,
4:30 AM EDT), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/08/senate-recordbreaking-gridlocktrump-303811; Clay Risen, Why Are So Many Government
Positions
Still
Vacant?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
31,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/31/us/politics/biden-cabinetappointments.html.
9
Chris Jones, Supreme Court Confirmations & Partisanship, MEDIUM (July 9,
2018),
https://medium.com/@swedishjones/supreme-court-confirmationspartianship-a23cb4ec111b (presenting statistics of “for” and “against” votes for
presidential nominations of justices from Presidents Harry Truman to Donald
Trump that highlight a trend of increasing contention over nominees). In
highlighting the increasing partisanship of the process, Jones observed with
now-Justice Brett Kavanaugh “[i]f credentials alone mattered, Kavanaugh
would fly through the Senate.” Id. Partisanship may also have affected the
nomination process for now-Justice Amy Coney Barrett. See Bruce Peabody,
How the Supreme Court Can Maintain Its Legitimacy Amid Intensifying
Partisanship, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 20, 2020, 8:20 AM EDT),
https://theconversation.com/how-the-supreme-court-can-maintain-itslegitimacy-amid-intensifying-partisanship-148126. Marshall discusses part of
the source of the controversy and yet another example of President Barack
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inaction has also not gone unnoticed. For example, state
governments acted just last year to handle the pressing
matter of drug pricing; their worries about “political
divisiveness, a packed congressional schedule, and a
looming election year” not bringing the needed relief in time
are readily apparent.10
What is to be done to address the increasing reality
of paralyzing, partisan rancor in our legislature? Professor
William Marshall proposed that congressional inaction
threatening “the ability of the government to function”
should be “subject to constitutional scrutiny.”11 While it is
noble to invoke the Constitution to strive for “turning
members away from the mindset of separation of parties that
currently dominates political culture,” Marshall concedes
“[i]t is difficult to discern an obligation for Congress to act
from the existing jurisprudence.”12
This article is a response to Marshall’s proposal and
offers a potential solution based on alternative dispute
resolution rather than the courts. When faced with
seemingly insurmountable differences, Congress must look
to alternative dispute resolution to reach a breakthrough on
critical issues. This paper proposes the creation of a
Mediation Office to assist Congress in coming to these
breakthroughs.
This mechanism could also possibly
Obama’s nominee, then-Judge Merrick Garland. See Marshall, supra note 7, at
170.
10
Steven Findlay, Not waiting for Congress, states pass laws to lower drug
costs,
ABC
News
(September
9,
2019,
8:31
AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/waiting-congress-states-pass-laws-lower-drugcosts/story?id=65483775. Thirty-three states at the time enacted laws to
address affordability and access to prescription drugs, though concede “states
can only go in addressing drug prices, and that federal legislation would be
necessary to have a major impact . . . .” Id.
11
Marshall, supra note 7, at 168, 174. Marshall advocates this treatment should
only apply to situations such as appropriations and appointments to keep the
government running. Id. Refusal to sign off on legislation due to opposing a
president’s policy for example should be left “constitutionally unobjectionable.”
Id.
12
Id. at 171.
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intervene when the issue is between Congress and the
President.
Part II of this article will elucidate Marshall’s
argument and clearly define the issues that would trigger the
Mediation Office to act. Part III will lay out the author’s
proposal for how the body would be created, how it would
operate, and it will defend why Congress, rather than another
branch of the government, is best suited to remedy the issue
of legislative deadlock. Part IV will both justify the legality
of the body and set forth the benefits that could come of it.
Finally, part V will address some potential objections to the
author’s proposal and attempt to assuage some of these
concerns. Part VI will conclude by reminding readers our
government is not a watch to be wound and left to its own
devices. As new challenges arise, our system should adapt
to meet them. In this case, mediation may be the longawaited solution to breaking the logjam.
II.
Background
To begin, I will first lay out Marshall’s position on
which issues he believed should trigger scrutiny and his
rationale. While I am mostly in agreement with Marshall’s
assessment, I would add an additional category for national
emergencies and thus disagree with his separation of
functionality versus legislation distinctions as overly narrow.
Marshall determines whether Congress’ decision to
do nothing is problematic “based on the type of power that
Congress is (or is not) exercising,” taking issue when “the
exercise of the power in question is necessary for the
government to function.” 13 Marshall mainly focuses on
“appropriations or, in the case of the Senate, its failure to
consider presidential appointments” 14 but “leave[s] for a
13

Id. at 162. Like Marshall, I advocate for the issues that will trigger alternative
dispute resolution (“ADR”) to be determined categorically, rather than “how
purportedly egregious the congressional behavior in question appears to be.”
Id. at 168.
14
Id. at 168 n.59 (arguing failure to make appointments interferes with the
President’s ability to execute the laws under Article II of the Constitution).
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later discussion whether other congressional powers . . .
should or could trigger constitutional scrutiny when
Congress fails to act.”15
Outside of what he deems core functions of
“maintain[ing] and preserv[ing] the government,” Marshall
asserts “the government can continue to operate in the
absence of new legislation . . . while it may amount to bad
policy or bad government . . . .”16
Marshall’s observations of why a constitutional
theory of accountability may be difficult to implement are
persuasive. First, Article I of the U.S. Constitution issues
relatively few commands to Congress. 17 Furthermore,
besides defining the procedure to amend the Constitution,
oaths of office, how to count electoral votes, requiring
Congress to convene once a year, and determining if the
President is unfit for duty, there are very few mandates for
legislators. 18 Second, Marshall points out congressional
inaction could merely be a sign of the legislature doing its
job to check the President. 19 However, drawing the line
between constitutional and unconstitutional obstruction is

Id. at 168 (citing Josh Chaftez, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
715, 725 (2012) (noting failure to pass appropriations leads to shut down of the
entire government)). By appointments, Marshall seems to be concerned with
the executive positions that deal with the running of the government. Marshall,
supra note 7, at 168. For purposes of this article, I will not include the Supreme
Court in this category unless the Court would be unable to function with the
current number of justices.
16
Id. at 169.
17
See Marshall, supra note 7, at 164. See generally U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2, cl.
5, 3, cl. 5, 5, cl.1 & 3, 9, cl.7, 8, cl. 12.
18
See Marshall, supra note 7, at 164. See generally U.S. Const. arts. V, VI § 3,
amend. XII, XX, XXV, §4.
19
Id. at 164–65 (citing Why Gridlock Matters, supra note 5, at 2107). For a
more nuanced discussion that attempts to differentiate valid from invalid
congressional inaction, see generally Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative
Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2217 (2013) (describing the issues raised by congressional deadlock and further
distinguishing between inaction that works to check the executive and arbitrary
inaction that should be viewed as impermissible).
15
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difficult. 20 Finally, this difficulty is compounded when
partisan motivations are added to the mix as well as the
necessity for legislators to overcome their differences.21
Nonetheless, Marshall offers a number of
arguments in defense of this framework — reduceable to
four main themes.22 First, Marshall’s solution walks the line
between making meaningful change and running into
concerns about separation of powers. 23 For example, not
allowing presidents to make appointments obstructs their
Article II duties to faithfully execute the laws. 24 Second,
Marshall proposes spurring Congress to action will work to
reclaim power from the President by reducing the incentive
to act unilaterally. 25 Third, Congress will be more
incentivized to act if they can be criticized as failing
constitutionally rather than generally because “[s]pecific
critiques have bite.”26 Fourth, narrowly defining the duty to
act would make sense from a jurisprudence standpoint by
setting a standard that is “narrowly drawn and
extraordinarily well justified” because the duty to act “is not
easily supported by history, text, or structure.” 27 Finally,
Marshall asserts a constitutional duty to act would change

20

Marshall, supra note 7, at 165.
Id. at 166 (also highlighting the issue ambiguity will raise in terms of judicial
enforcement).
22
Id. at 168–71.
23
Id. at 168–69.
24
Id. at 169.
25
Id. at 169–70; see also Robert Pear, Maggie Haberman, & Reed Abelson,
Trump to Scrap Critical Health Care Subsidies, Hitting Obamacare Again, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
12,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/trump-obamacare-executiveorder-health-insurance.html (noting the Senate’s failure to reach the result
Trump wanted prompted him in part to dismantle funding for Obamacare
unilaterally via executive order). States as well may act on their own making
establishing uniform federal policy more difficult to implement. See Findlay,
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
26
Marshall, supra note 7, at 170.
27
Id. at 170–71.
21

147

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2022

7

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 5
[Vol. 22: 141, 2022]

Breaking the Congressional Logjam
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

political culture by uniting Congress in “common goals and
common obligations.”28
While I adopt Marshall’s categories for purposes of
this article as well as some of his reasons in support of his
proposition, I would add a third category of national
emergencies because “bad policy or bad government” in
these events spell arguably more dire consequences for the
nation.29 For example, while the government continued to
run without reaching a stimulus deal on COVID-19 relief, its
failure to reach an agreement caused considerable damage.30
Returning to the case of Puerto Rico, since Hurricane Maria
struck in 2017, the federal government promised $50 billion
dollars in aid—only $16.7 billion having made it to the
island thus far.31 In circumstances like the pandemic and
those in Puerto Rico, the welfare of the people should
amount to more than a mere policy difference.32
Ultimately, this paper proposes three categories
which will trigger the congressional Mediation Office to act.
The Mediation Office will step in when where the dispute
28

Id. at 171.
Id. at 169.
30
Neil Irwin, The Pandemic Depression is Over. The Pandemic Recession has
Just
Begun,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
3,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/upshot/pandemic-economyrecession.html (predicting there will not be economic steadiness until 2023 or
2024 and millions of Americans will find difficulty getting another job when
the economy reopens). Subsequently, Congress was able to pass a relief bill
after months of struggle. See Deidre Walsh, Congress Passes $900 Billion
Coronavirus Relief Bill, Ending Months-Long Stalemate, NPR (Dec. 21, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/12/21/948862052/house-passes-900-billioncoronavirus-relief-bill-ending-months-long-stalemate.
31
Nicole Acevido, Puerto Rico Sees More Pain and Little Progress Three Years
After Hurricane Maria, NBC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2020, 2:30 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/puerto-rico-sees-more-pain-littleprogress-three-years-after-n1240513. Acevido notes that opposition by the
President as well as a lag in federal agencies delivering the funding are major
sources of why Puerto Rico is still struggling. Id. Congress made aid available
in 2018, however the President obstructed it from carrying out the relief. Id.
32
See Jones, supra note 9. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall
have Power to . . . provide for . . . [the] general Welfare of the United States”).
29
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involves appropriations to keep the government running;
when an impasse is reached over presidential appointments;
and when there is an impasse in times of natural emergencies.
I will elaborate more on the issue of interpreting whether an
issue falls into this category in the following section of this
article.
III.
Proposed Solution
In order to break gridlock when one of these issues
arises, Congress should form a dedicated Mediation Office
of outside, nonpartisan specialists to assist them in coming
to a resolution.33 The Mediation Office shall be an executive
department with the head appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate in usual fashion.34 Congress would
be advised to secure some independence for the Mediation
Office by limiting the executive’s ability to remove the head
of the department for cause. 35 Given the already present
difficulties created by extreme partisanship, any real or
perceived threat of intervention by the Executive in the

33

To avoid constitutional concerns, mediation is the best course of action since
an outside body that has authority to bind the lawmakers would likely run afoul
of the Constitution. “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
34
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
35
For-cause provisions can be constitutionally valid if the limitation applies to
an inferior officer and does not unduly impede the President’s ability to oversee
the executive branch. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694–97 (1988). It
would have to be established that first, like the independent counsel in Olson,
the official would have “limited jurisdiction and tenure and lack[] policymaking
and significant administrative authority.” Id. at 692. Indeed, this official
would—the Mediation Office only would have the power assigned to it by
Congress to flag the key issues and provide support in brokering a compromise
on those issues to aid in drafting a bill in a nonbinding manner that leaves
Congress free to make the decisions themselves. Second, a for-cause provision
does not leave a president with no means “to ensure the ‘faithful’ execution of
the laws . . . the executive . . . retains ample authority to assure that the [official]
is competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities.” Id. at 692.
Misconduct remains actionable, and thus, the Executive would retain the ability
to ensure the Mediation Office is performing as it should.
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process could likely threaten its workability. 36 Because
Congress itself will draft the bill that brings the Mediation
Office into existence, they can necessarily settle matters of
budget, support staff, and procedures or constitutionally
delegate those responsibilities. Necessarily, those chosen to
mediate will have policy experience in whichever field the
legislators require assistance. The system will work in three
phases.
First, bills that are presented for debate will be
reviewed by the office and flagged if they contain issues that
fall into the three specified categories. While some may
describe Marshall’s line drawing as simplistic, his two
categories of appropriations and appointments set clear
boundaries of what qualifies and what does not.37 The third
category of national emergencies is more complex. Much
scholarship focuses on emergencies in the context of those
declared by the President to gain broad powers to act, which
have been tempered “through statute, largely after the
fact.”38 Necessarily, that definition will likely be massaged
into the creating act through legislation and delegation as
well. It is understandable that Congress will seek to
narrowly define terms where discretion is due to avoid being
constrained by this body. I will address these concerns later
under Possible Objections in Part V of this article.
Second, the mediation mechanism will be triggered
in three scenarios. In the best interests of allowing Congress
See Marshall, supra note 7, at 167 (“At present, the pressures of polarization
are so forceful that even members of Congress who might otherwise work
across the aisle are deterred from doing so.”).
37
Id. at 169.
38
Kim Lane Scheppele, North American Emergencies: The Use of Emergency
Powers in Canada and the United States, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. (2006) 213. See
generally Marshall, supra note 7 for a detailed tracing of the evolution of the
United States’ definition of emergency powers and efforts to control those
exercised by the Executive. Because national emergencies and their
consequences enter a scholarly realm that is beyond the limited purpose of this
article, I will have to be content with allowing Congress to fashion the
parameters of the triggering emergencies themselves.
36

150

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol22/iss1/5

10

Archibald: Breaking the Congressional Logjam
[Vol. 22: 141, 2022]

Breaking the Congressional Logjam
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

every opportunity to act of their own volition, these
scenarios necessarily describe failures that can occur in the
legislative process. In the first instance, failure of a bill with
one or more key issues to pass a vote will trigger
mediation.39 The aim is to avoid situations where Senators
or Representatives leave Capitol Hill without a compromise.
Second, the Legislature would have the ability to invoke the
mediation mechanism at any time. Finally, mediation would
be triggered if a proposed bill with one or more key issues
was scrapped in committee before seeing a floor vote.
Third, in the actual mediation phase, the mediation
will act to both reduce the number of parties in the room
(even the perceived power between the parties), providing
guidance and support on resolving the issue.40 Initially, to
ease the bargaining process, only the heads of each party and
the relevant committee leaders would be parties to the
mediation. By only including those in charge of the matters,
the key players can be insulated from group pressure.41 The
39

See generally L. Michael Hager, Congress Needs a Mediation Tool to
Dissolve Gridlock (June 18, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/contenfarticle/2010/06/17/AR2010061704566.html;
see
also Sarah
Gonski, Easing Gridlock in the United States Congress through Mediation:
Letting our Cities and Streets Teach Us Lessons on Getting Along, A.B.A., 1, 2
(2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/dispute_resolutiori/lawsc
hool/boskey_essay_contest/2013/easing_gridlock_in_the_united_states_congr
ess_through_medication_letting_our_cities_and_states_teach_us_lessons_on_
getting_along.authcheckdam.pdf.
40
See generally Hager, supra note 39.
41
Vice News, 15 Departing Congress Members Tell the Newbies What to
Expect, YOUTUBE (Jan. 14, 2019), https://youtu.be/3gQbt0h5UQk. The
importance of this point is underscored by interviews of departing Congress
members conducted by Alexandra Pelosi. See id. Paul Ryan describes the
House of Representatives as a game of rugby where the entire team (voting
together) is needed to move the ball. Id. In a more humorous instance, one
member describes his experience getting “rolled” by former Speaker John
Boehner, being cornered in a bathroom, and cajoled to vote with the party. Id.
Noting that “[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on
other bills,” in cases of appropriations the leaders of the House of
Representatives may also need to be involved in the mediation process to satisfy
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method for choosing the mediators is part of balancing the
power in the room. Each party would be allowed to choose
one mediator, and the chosen mediators would choose a third
to act as the chair. 42 However, as written by Pamela
Esterman et al. for the New York State Bar Association,
“parties have the opportunity to design their own unique
approach and structure for each mediation.”43 The ultimate
goal of each triggered mediation would be to draft a
compromise bill of only the key issues the parties could
agree on to introduce and pass through the normal
constitutional process.44 This article does not contemplate
the imposition of any time constraints. While an expedient
resolution may be the most beneficial, some issues may be
more complex than others and thus demand more time to
resolve. The passage of the bill through both chambers
would allow the parties to break through the partisan rancor

the demands of the Constitution if drafting a new appropriations bill. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7.
42
AM. ARB. ASS’N, A GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION
FOR
BUSINESS
PEOPLE
20
(2013),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/A%20Guide%20t
o%20Commercial.pdf. The process would largely model the AAA’s methods
for choosing arbitrators in the party arbitration panel context. Even if each party
to the negotiation chose a mediator arguably partial to their arguments, the two
mediators could compromise in their selection of a chair to preserve neutrality.
43
PAMELA ESTERMAN, MICHAEL KENNEALLY, JR. & HOWARD PROTTER, THE
BENEFITS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR RESOLVING MUNICIPAL
DISPUTES
2
(2011),
https://nysba.org/NYSBA/Sections/Dispute%20Resolution/Dispute%20Resol
ution%20PDFs/Municipalwhitepaper12-21-2010.pdf.
Naturally, as each
dispute would be different, the relevant members of Congress would be given
liberal authority to structure the mediation along with their mediators to be most
productive under the circumstances.
44
The bill must still pass through both the House of Representatives and Senate
before being signed into law by the President. U.S. CONST. art. I, §7. Though
it may be prudent to preserve the compromise, it will be up to the judgment of
House and Senate leadership whether to limit debate on the compromise to
expedite its passing or protect it from unfriendly amendments.
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as well as benefit their constituents, assuming the President
is on board with the compromise bill.45
Because the mediation is nonbinding, the possibility
the parties will walk away without reaching a compromise
remains.46 This proposal does not suggest a remedy beyond
this point. Perhaps public censure will serve to punish the
members for failure to reach a compromise. 47 This is
discussed further in a later section of this article.48
To implement this system into the workings of the
legislative bodies, both the House of Representatives and the
Senate will likely need to amend their own rules of
procedure.49 The process for the Senate appears to be more
straightforward.50
According to Rule V, the Senate has two options to
apply the mediation procedures—either by suspending or
amending the rules. 51 Either option requires one day’s
notice in writing before the motion is considered or can be
45

Even if the President vetoes the compromise, both houses of Congress can
vote to override the veto if the bill gains two thirds of the vote. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 7. While admittedly wishful thinking, perhaps Congress will be more
likely to use this power to protect their compromise from an unreasonable
president. See Marshall, supra note 7, at 167 (noting, ironically, legislative
gridlock promotes the expansion of presidential power by encouraging the
President to act unilaterally, thus spurring Congress to be more active may curb
presidential power and spur the legislature to continue to do so in defense of
their powers); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
46
See AM. ARB. ASS’N, A GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION FOR BUSINESS PEOPLE, supra note 42.
47
See supra note 25 and accompanying text. However, the censure that would
come from failure of the proposed system would arise mainly from constituent
dissatisfaction.
48
See infra Part IV.B.
49
See CLERK H.R., 116TH CONG., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
(2019),
[hereinafter
HOUSE
RULES]
https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/documents/116House-Rules-Clerk.pdf; COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., SENATE MANUAL
CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS
AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 1131, at 5 (2014) [hereinafter SENATE RULES].
50
SENATE RULES, supra note 49, at 5.
51
Id.
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accomplished without notice by “unanimous consent of the
Senate.”52 In consideration of practicality, creating a new
rule to codify how the procedure will be implemented on one
occasion eliminates the possibility of unnecessary barriers.
If a suspension of the rules were sought on each occasion
mediation would be triggered, it would be all too easy to
thwart its implementation if unanimous consent could not be
achieved or a motion could be defeated at every turn.
Further, in the context of appropriations bills, the
amendment process would also create further hurdles
compared to the creation of a new rule.53 The Senate may
not receive amendments “to any general appropriation bill,
the effect of which will be to increase an appropriation
already contained in the bill, or to add a new item of
appropriation . . . .”54
The House of Representatives’ rules do not contain
an equally straightforward procedure.55 The bill that brings
this mechanism to life will likely require the House Rules’
changes to be within the text.56 The House Rules in their
current state further support the need to create a new rule to
prevent further gridlock.57
Whether the Mediation Office could be
automatically triggered when the deadlock is between
Congress and the President is an entirely different question
52

Id.
See id. at 14–16.
54
Id. at 14. While these types of amendments can be accomplished with the aid
of committees having jurisdiction, if the Legislature is already gridlocked to the
point of triggering the mechanism, how much could be accomplished by the
amendment process may be questionable. Id.
55
See id. (noting the lack of a similar rule dedicated to suspension of the rules
or amendments contained in SENATE RULES, supra note 49, at 5).
56
See HOUSE RULES, supra note 49, at 6, 8 (the legislation must be referred to
standing committees that have legislative jurisdiction over them, in this case the
Rules Committee since implementing the mediation system would not appear
to implicate the Official Code of Conduct and likely the order of business in the
House).
57
Id. at 37 (limiting the House’s ability to agree on Senate Amendments
involving appropriations under Rule 12).
53
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of separation of powers. The question is worth asking
because the President’s signature is needed to make a bill a
law. 58 Even if a compromise was reached with the
assistance of the Mediation Office, an unwilling president
can derail the fruits of compromise with a veto.59 Because
this article focuses on Congress, whether the Executive can
be bound by Congress to mediate is a question to be
answered at a different time. However, mediation extending
beyond Congress to the Executive is unlikely for three
reasons. First, the Constitution arguably provides a
mechanism for Congress to defend their compromise by
overriding the veto.60 While mustering a supermajority of
both houses of Congress is a difficult task, it may be more
achievable when the legislature is more united behind a
bill.61 If the President has already vetoed the bill, they are
likely beyond discussion or compromise. 62 Second, the
President is largely involved in the legislative process and
would likely make their voice heard to the Legislature. 63
Because legislating is not a closed system, the President’s
thoughts will more likely than not be taken into account in
drafting, arguing, and attempting to compromise on
legislation.64 Finally, because the Mediation Office would
form a new executive department, the mediator’s neutrality
58

U.S. CONST. art 1, §7.
Id.
60
Id.
61
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
62
Cf. Marshall, supra note 7, at 165 (“A President focused on making
government work will be motivated to take actions that circumvent
congressional blockage.”).
63
See Lisa Mascaro & Jill Colvin, House Approves Trump’s $2K Checks,
Sending to GOP-led Senate, ASSOC. PRESS (Dec. 28, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-florida-coronavirus-pandemicfinancial-markets-bills-f750c127c0d39a62a86ca39ef11ae7db
(showing
President Trump’s sizeable impact on current events surrounding COVID-19
relief as well as the override showdown over the defense bill that bolsters this
paper’s theory that Congress can band together to defend its compromises).
64
See Marshall, supra note 7, at 169 (“Presidents have increasingly taken on
the role as ‘legislator-in-chief’. . . .”).
59
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may be questioned since they are ultimately employed by
one of the parties.65 Congress would likely avoid entering
into a bargaining setting at a disadvantage. 66 Ultimately,
while mediation may be beneficial between the President
and Congress, such discussions seem unlikely.67
In all, creating new rules to accommodate the
mediation system would seem to provide the most expedient
solution to implementing mediation. This method meets the
twin goals of reducing complexity and minimizing
opportunities for procedural haggling.
Before justifying the body (both legally and in terms
of potential benefits), I will defend why Congress must be
the government branch to implement this solution to
legislative gridlock. First, courts are precluded from issuing
advisory opinions and lack a solid jurisprudential foundation
to act; second, the Executive lacks independent legislative
authority and would provide no benefit to a divided
government.68
Article III of the Constitution provides limitations
on the courts.69 According to Professor Alexander Bickel,
the courts “may make no pronouncements in the large and
abstract, . . . and may give no opinions, even in a concrete
case, which are advisory because they are not finally
decisive . . . .”70 According to Westling, this ban on issuing
65

See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
See Marshall, supra note 7, at 160 (noting that Congress “should have the
authority not to accede to executive branch direction.”).
67
Cf. ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR., & PROTTER, supra note 43, at 8–9 (noting
that many disputes involving public officers “often become political,” and
“these officials will likely have to continue working with one another . . . [so]
resolving these disputes through a non-adversarial mediation process will help
preserve the working relationship needed between these officials.”).
68
See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2. While the President does possess significant
power, many actions require the advice and consent of the Senate. Id.
Additionally, the Constitution does not grant the President any unitary
legislative power. Id. at §§ 1–4.
69
See id. at § 2.
70
Richard W. Westling, Advisory Opinions and the “Constitutionally Required”
Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 63 TUL. L. REV. 379, 392
66
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advisory opinions arises in part due to separation of
powers.71 Without a case or adverse parties, there would be
no case “arising under [the] Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and treaties made . . . .” and the question of
whether Congress should act would only be hypothetical.72
The Court cannot weigh in “on questions that are ‘abstract,
hypothetical or contingent.’” 73
Thus, without a
constitutional or statutory system in place compelling action,
there is little the Court can do to address the gridlock
problem.74 Second, as Marshall already noted, the courts
have neither constitutional mandates nor a strong
jurisprudential background for demanding action.75
The executive branch is also an unlikely place to
find a solution. First, the President lacks independent
legislative power.76 Continuing to read Article II, Section
Three of the Constitution, the President also has the power
to convene Congress “on extraordinary occasions,” perhaps
begging the question of why, in times of crises, the President
does not simply call the Legislature back and advise them to
settle their disagreements.77 The Framers “understood that
the government must be able to meet exigent

(1988) (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH—THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 114-15 (92d ed. 1986)).
71
Westling, supra note 70, at 395 (recounting that Chief Justice John Jay
declined to advise President Washington regarding treaties between the United
States and France because “the lines of separation drawn by the Constitution
between the three departments” and that the Supreme Court was “a court in the
last resort”).
72
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Westling, supra note 70, at 395.
73
Westling, supra note 70, at 396 (quoting Alabama State Fed’n of Lab. v.
McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945)).
74
See Westling, supra note 70, at 395 (noting that “no article III case exists”
when there is “[n]o lawsuit” and “no parties are adverse.”).
75
See Marshall, supra note 7, at 170–71.
76
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall from time to time . . . recommend to
[Congress’s] Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient”). See also supra note 54.
77
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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circumstances.”78 This part of Article II was likely not used
because it has rarely been invoked in our nation’s history.79
Another explanation could be that the President’s power to
convene Congress was rendered obsolete.80 In sum, the lack
of legislative power and limited administrative powers do
not give the Executive an ability to compel congressional
action on the three categories of issues.
Second, the presence of the Executive may serve to
hamper more than help a divided Congress depending on
how control of the houses and the presidency appear at the
time. The party out of power may feel more threatened by
the presence of the Executive, seeing any negotiation
brokered by the Executive as a two-on-one scenario versus
having the security of a neutral at the table. 81 I find it
unlikely that the Executive who likely has a legislative
agenda and is also a partisan official belonging to the same
78

David F. Forte, Convening of Congress, in FOUNDATION, THE HERITAGE
HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 286 (David. F. Forte & Matthew
Spalding, eds., 2d ed. 2014). Surely a crisis such as the plight of Americans
facing COVID-19 might be considered exigent. This power was given with
purposeful limitations, the example of the English monarchy suspending
parliament at-will fresh in the Framers’ minds. Id.
79
Id. (noting the Framers envisioned the need would likely arise from foreign
policy concerns such as war and other unexpected events but was only used
twenty-seven times).
80
Id. (noting the ratification of the Twentieth Amendment set a date for
Congress to convene every year and the standard practice was for Congress to
remain in session for twelve months); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XX.
81
See Myron S. Greenberg & Megan A. Blazina, What Mediators Need to Know
About Class Actions: A Basic Primer, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 191, 212 (2004)
(quoting JOHN W. COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY 9 (1st ed., 1996)
(“Mediation has been defined as ‘a process in which a disinterested third party
(or neutral) assists the disputants . . .”’); ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR., &
PROTTER, supra note 43, at 3 (“Moreover, since they are heard in the presence
of a neutral authority figure, the parties often feel that they have had ‘their day
in court.’”). This is not to say the power dynamics in Congress will not enter
the negotiations. However, a third-party neutral may aid in ensuring the
discussion remains focused on the issues at hand rather than discussions that
would break down compromise. A neutral would also be beneficial even when
the minority party also has the presidency, as the majority party can feel secure
if the president takes interest in the mediation on the side of their political
adversaries.
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party as one of those at the table would find much success in
“reconcil[ing] the parties and their positions.”82
Overall, Congress remains in the best position to
solve their own problem of gridlock via mediation when the
three categories of issues are triggered. The Court lacks
constitutional authority to intervene without a present case
or controversy. 83 Additionally, the Executive as an
interested party may do more harm than good when
attempting to help bridge the divide between the legislators.
IV.
Justification
This section will accomplish two goals. First, I will
defend the legality of creating the body while addressing
nondelegation issues. Second, I will discuss the potential
benefits of introducing mediation into Congress when
deadlock occurs surrounding the key issues.
A.
Legality
Because the body will not be making law per se like
a regulatory agency such as the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”), the nondelegation doctrine may
not necessarily apply. However, even if the issue is raised,
the mediation body should pass constitutional muster.84
First, the nondelegation doctrine may not apply
because the mediation department will not deliberate nor
create laws or regulations on its own.85 Esterman et al. notes
that parties to mediation, in this case the rival camps of
Congress, would “retain control and tailor their own solution”
rather than handing the matter off to a third-party agency to
make a decision on their behalf.86 Facilitating and assisting
82

Greenberg & Blazina, supra note 81, at 212.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.
84
“[P]retty much every statute nonetheless survives non-delegation review. The
non-delegation doctrine is notoriously lax-or should we say it’s kind of
fictitious?” Alexander Volokh, Judicial Non-Delegation, the Inherent Powers
Corollary and Federal Common Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1391, 1392 (2017).
85
ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR., & PROTTER, supra note 43, at 2 (defining
mediation as the engaging of a neutral third party to work with the parties in
order to facilitate resolution of the dispute).
86
Id.
83
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in the part of the process of law-making is not likely an act
of legislative authority. 87 Furthermore, any solution that
comes out of the mediation process would still have to be
voted on and signed into law through the normal process.88
However, the Constitution’s instructions are clear—
legislative authority cannot be ignored. Although a
delegation of power would be mainly procedural, it may be
viewed nonetheless as legislative authority. If this is the case,
then the Mediation Office must not run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.
While the theoretical justifications for the nondelegation doctrine are “somewhat unclear,” they begin with
the separation of powers and the Vesting Clause. 89
Legislative authority is exclusively granted to Congress by
the Vesting Clause in Article I of the U.S. Constitution.90
This language is the source of the non-delegation doctrine’s
power.91 Yet, despite the Constitution’s deliberate language,
Congress routinely delegates much of its regulatory and lawmaking powers to the administrative state. 92 While not
87

See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Opponents will argue the
automatic triggering of a procedure in Congress would be an exertion of
authority over the members. However, if Congress enacts the process into law,
they are exerting legislative authority over themselves rather than the office
independently acting over Congress.
88
See supra Part III (noting Congress is not being bypassed using the ADR
mechanism). Furthermore, Congress may very well walk away from the
mediation without reaching a solution, meaning they are not tightly bound to
the Mediation Office’s procedures.
89
Nathan K. Noh, Non-Delegation as Non-Deliberation, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS &
PUB. POL’Y 379, 383 (2016).
90
U.S. CONST. art. I., § 1. (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House
of Representatives.”).
91
Volokh, supra note 84, at 1393.
92
Noh, supra note 89, at 379. Noh finds the doctrine’s laxness disturbing
regarding the separation of powers, though not all share his bleak view. Id. See
also id. at 382–83 (listing the more “pragmatic” justifications for delegating
legislative authority). See also A.J. Kritikos, Resuscitating the Non-Delegation
Doctrine: A Compromise and an Experiment, 82 MO. L. REV. 441, 442 (2017)
(asserting the Supreme Court “whittled the non-delegation doctrine down to a
nub because of practical concerns with implementing it” rather than
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everyone shares the same enthusiasm for this practice,
Volokh, Noh, and Kritikos agree that the doctrine is weak
and does not present much of a challenge to new
legislation.93
When delegating authority to an executive
department, Congress must “always provide an ‘intelligible
principle’ to guide the delegation” and “must make at least
certain hard choices rather than entirely passing
responsibility to someone else.”94 If this sounds like an easy
standard to meet, it’s because it is. The late Justice Scalia
provided insight into the Court’s reluctance to take a tougher
look when he dissented in Mistretta v. United States, writing
“while the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is
unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional
system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the
courts.”95 Put more straightforwardly, the Court does not
believe it can “draw a clear line delineating permissible from
impermissible delegations.”96 Consequently, Congress has
enjoyed the ability to delegate with very little specificity
using wording such as “‘unduly or unnecessarily
complicate[d]’ corporate structures and ‘unfair[] or
inequitabl[e]’ . . . price controls, and the ‘public interest.’”97

“repudiat[ing] the [non-delegation doctrine’s] theoretical underpinnings . . .
or . . . its importance in maintaining the separation of powers.”).
93
See supra note 84 and accompanying text; see also Kritikos, supra note 92,
at 442 (describing the non-delegation doctrine as a toothless test and thus
“unsurprisingly, no statutes fail that low bar, and it is a bar that the Court has
lowered even further over time.”).
94
Volokh, supra note 84, at 1393; Noh, supra note 89, at 381 (“If the executive
branch is to be able to engage in lawmaking at all, it may do so only when such
power is properly delegated to it.”).
95
Kritikos, supra note 92, at 444 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
96
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415. See also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531
U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (“We have ‘almost never felt qualified to secondguess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can
be left to those executing or applying the law.’”).
97
Volokh, supra note 84, at 1393.
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Another theory advocated by Law Professors Eric
Posner and Adrian Vermuele attempting to explain nondelegation posits administrative agencies do not wield
lawmaking power at all.98 While lawmakers cannot delegate
their ability to vote for legislation or wield their other
constitutional grants of power such as oversight, they are
able to statutorily grant the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to the executive branch. 99 In this sense,
Congress is legislating by granting the authority to create
rules and regulations to the executive branch, and the
executive branch is merely executing the duly passed law.100
The Constitution’s Take Care Clause authorizes the
execution of laws. 101 Thus, allowing administrative
agencies to create rules pursuant to the law should not run
afoul of the separation of powers.
Finally, Thomas Merrill posits the doctrine should
not be thought of in terms of non-delegation but of exclusive
delegation, arguing delegating authority is not per se
unconstitutional. 102
The source of the confusion
surrounding the non-delegation doctrine arises from tension
between the non-delegation doctrine and the exclusive
delegation doctrine. 103 According to Merrill, the two
principles are not in conflict but rather work together.104 In
other words, Congress must clearly delegate rule making
authority to the agency, and the agency is then bound by the
grant of authority.105 Merrill explains this theory through
two principles. First, under his anti-inherency principle,
both the Executive and Judiciary cannot act on their own
98

Noh, supra note 89, at 384.
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1723 (2002).
100
Id.
101
Noh, supra note 89, at 384; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
102
Noh, supra note 89, at 384–85.
103
Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2101 (2004).
104
Id. at 2100.
105
Noh, supra note 88, at 385.
99
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with the force of law but must trace their authority to act to
existing law. 106 The second principle, the transferability
principle, allows Congress “to vest executive and judicial
officers with authority to act with the force of law, including
the authority to promulgate legislative regulations
functionally indistinguishable from statutes.”107 Thus, while
the “intelligible principle” test determines if Congress
clearly authorized administrative law making without too
much discretion (non-delegation), exclusive delegation is
met when the agencies do not act outside the bounds of the
power they were given.108
The Mediation Office should be able to pass review
through all three formulations. First, the office would not be
exercising unconstitutional levels of discretion where it
lacks an “intelligible principle.”109 With clear instructions
for their functions as well as clear rules for when and how
the office will act, the Mediation Office has far more than
“the public interest” to guide the delegation of their
authority.110 Second, Posner and Vermeule’s formulation of
the non-delegation doctrine also poses no challenge to the
Mediation Office.111 If the office’s activities are not seen as
an exercise of legislative power, but rather executive, neither
Congress nor the executive branch violate the separation of
powers.112 Performing mediations as authorized would be
taking care that the law is faithfully executed rather than
creating law by helping to facilitate the process.113 Finally,

106

Merrill, supra note 103, at 2101.
Id.
108
Id. at 2099, 2101.
109
See supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.
110
See supra Part III.
111
See generally Posner & Vermeule, supra note 99.
112
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
113
See Noh, supra note 89, at 383. However, I must concede; the question of
whether mediating in the legislative process involves an impermissible
delegation of “de jure legislative power” is not fully answered in this article.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 99, at 1723. While the office is safe
107
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the office will pass review under the exclusive delegation
doctrine. If Congress is not forbidden from delegating
because they clearly delegated authority, the Constitution
should not forbid the creation of the office or its work.114
First, as explained above, the Mediation Office would have
an intelligible principle and clear delegation of authority to
provide mediation assistance.115 While the executive branch
could not act on its own, it would be constitutionally vested
with authority within the proscribed limits through Merrill’s
transferability principle. 116 In all, so long as Congress
creates the Mediation Office and vests it with authority
through duly passed legislation, it should not run afoul of the
Constitution.
B.
Potential Benefits
After justifying the Mediation Office’s legality, I
will next highlight seven potential benefits of introducing
mediation to Congress. Esterman et al. explicitly recognizes
potential benefits exist in using ADR to resolve disputes
between elected officials or bodies, which the Mediation
Office is designed to do.117 These benefits will be explained
in more detail below. In all, the hope is to give our
legislators the tools to come together and find “the
persistence that is often necessary to help the parties reach a
resolution” without sacrificing control.118
First, mediation provides an outside perspective
without taking control out of lawmakers’ hands. Unlike
arbitration or more formal mechanisms of dispute resolution,
the parties can design a mediation with the help of the

procedurally, issues may arise when formulating the exact duties and powers
exercised by it.
114
See Noh, supra note 89, at 384–85.
115
See supra Part III.
116
Merrill, supra note 103, at 2101.
117
ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR., & PROTTER, supra note 43, at 8.
118
Id. at 3.
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mediator to best suit their needs.119 Even with the parties
remaining largely in control, mediators are able to assist in
the decision making process.120 Finally, mediators help both
sides of the aisle feel heard and cut through the adversarial
roadblocks.121 With these roadblocks cleared, lengthy floor
debates engaged in for the purpose of making objections
heard could be minimized, more focused, or avoided.
Second, mediation can provide an organizational
structure more conducive to solving the problem. According
to Esterman et al., “an experienced mediator can . . . help
identify and frame the relevant interests and issues of the
parties, [and] . . . identify and assist in solving impediments
to settlement.”122 Often times, legislation is multi-part and
incredibly complex.123 Different objections and issues can
arise which can make setting an agenda a logistical
nightmare.124 Mediation presents an “opportunity to break
down the facts and issues into smaller components, enabling
119

Id. at 2. While arbitration also offers a more efficient system of dispute
resolution, the finality of an arbitrator’s decision raises issues as to whether
Congress would be unlawfully giving away their de jure powers to vote on
legislation. Id. at 6; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 99, at 1723.
ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR., & PROTTER, supra note 43, at 3 (“An
experienced mediator can serve as a sounding board, help . . . the parties test
their case [and] . . . if asked provide a helpful and objective analysis of the
merits to each of the parties, foster and even suggest creative solutions . . . .”).
120

121

Id.

122

Id.

123

Walsh, supra note 30. For example, the recently passed COVID-19 stimulus
bill was a colossal 5,593-page piece of legislation. Id. While this bill was an
aberration (the average bill length was 15 pages for the 109th Congress),
spending bills “frequently run more than 1,000 [pages].” Christopher Beam,
Paper Weight: The Health Care Bill is More Than 1,000 Pages. Is That a Lot?,
SLATE (Aug. 20, 2009), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/08/is-1000pages-long-for-a-piece-of-legislation.html.
124

ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR., & PROTTER, supra note 43, at 3.
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the parties to separate the matters that they agree upon and
those that they do not yet agree upon.” 125 Importantly,
breaking down the issues is critical to avoid being bogged
down in lengthy bills and creating stalemates that could last
potentially for months caused by “partisan sniping” or the
sheer enormity of the task.126
Third, one of Marshall’s goals may yet be
realized. 127 Bringing parties together through mediation
may in fact start “turning members away from the mindset
of separation of parties that currently dominates political
culture.” 128 Esterman et al. agrees and further posits
mediation can save the crucial working relationships
developed in political offices. 129 Especially in the Senate
where terms of office are for six years, legislators will
continue to need to work together and compromise multiple
times.130 When politics enter the dispute, solutions are more
difficult to come by and the public can become more cynical
and lose faith in their representatives.131 Mediation will help
the country by breaking the logjam and also personally
benefit our representatives. Prolonged disputes can create
high emotional tolls which can be diffused with the presence
of a mediator to ensure less adversarial proceedings and help
parties maintain a good relationship.132 In situations where
an ongoing relationship or a solution is reasonably expected,
Id. (“[T]he mediator can be indispensable to this process by separating,
organizing, simplifying and addressing relevant issues”).
126
Walsh, supra note 30; see also Jones, supra note 9 (highlighting through
elected officials’ tweets the pressure that comes with having to vote quickly on
very large bills members barely have time to read).
127
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
128
Marshall, supra note 7, at 171; see also VICE NEWS, supra note 41
(underscoring the deep divisive culture through the story of two friends who
were both elected told not to eat lunch together due to partisan differences).
129
ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR., & PROTTER, supra note 43, at 7 (noting
because government bodies and officials will have to continue to work together,
preserving their relationships with ADR is in the best interests of the public).
130
Id. at 9.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 3.
125
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mediation can be quite helpful in protecting both the
compromise and relationship.133 Mediation may also make
it easier to reduce the instances of division caused by hard
feelings and make working together in the future less of a
daunting prospect.134
Fourth, the Mediation Office may pressure and
incentivize Congress to find solutions by increasing their
accountability to constituents. Congress for the fourteenth
consecutive year has ranked at the bottom of the list in terms
of how much confidence Americans have in their
institutions.135 In fact, Gallup has recently found fewer than
one in five Americans express confidence in their
legislators.136 The figure is startlingly low. An article by
Melissa De Witte may explain partly why this is the case.137
Relying on a study by Professor Jon Krosnick, De Witte
posits Americans “believe elected officials are not paying
enough attention to the general public.” 138 Instead, while
most Americans surveyed in the study felt the general
public’s opinions should be at the forefront of legislators’
minds, only twenty-eight percent believe this is the case.139
While mediation does not guarantee the influences of the
elite will be put behind those of the people, engaging in the
process may lessen the perception that legislators do not care

133

Greenberg & Blazina, supra note 81, at 212–13. While the article focuses
on ADR with respect to class actions, the party leadership can be thought of
representing their class of lawmakers, interests, donors, etc.
134
Id.
135
Megan Brenan, Amid Pandemic, Confidence in Key U.S. Institutions Surges,
GALLUP (August 12, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/317135/amidpandemic-confidence-key-institutions-surges.aspx
136
Id.
137
Melissa De Witte, Americans’ Low Opinion of Elected Officials Tied to
Perceptions of Decision-Making, Stanford Researchers Find, STAN. NEWS (Feb.
26, 2018), https://news.stanford.edu/2018/02/26/americans-dont-think-earelected-officials/.
138
Id.
139
Id. (noting seventy percent of Americans believe instead that elected
officials pay the most attention to campaign donors and the economic elite).
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about their constituents. 140 Krosnick asserts the way
forward to increase confidence in Congress is greater
transparency in explaining voting decisions to show the
people they are being heard.141 If legislators are obligated to
mediate key issues as proposed, failure to reach a
compromise is a fairly clear explanation partisanship got in
the way. When a smaller group of the leadership deadlocks,
even with the assistance of mediation, constituents should
hold their elected officials accountable. Consequently, the
pressure to not end up in this situation should encourage
lawmakers to compromise without mediation, or if it is
triggered, to ensure the mediation is fruitful. More
positively, when the American people see compromise, the
public approval will aid in reelection. While objectors will
accurately point out this influence is not strong given
reelection rates, this quandary will be dealt with in the next
section of this article under potential objections.142
Fifth, while mediation does not guarantee a more
efficient process, it may hasten an effective response to
emergencies or important matters such as keeping the
government funded and running.
While national
emergencies present unique challenges, avoidable hardships
passed onto the American people by an obstinate legislature
should be avoided at all costs.
Sixth, the benefits of compromising may entice
lawmakers to continue to broker solutions. According to
Greenburg and Blazina, the ability to communicate openly
about the dispute and be a part of the resolution confers

140

Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305,
325 (1971).
141
Id.
142
See Tom Murse, Do Members of Congress Ever Lose Re-Election?,
THOUGHTCO. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/do-congressmenever-lose-re-election-3367511 (noting reelection rates remain quite high
despite Congress’s near perpetual unpopularity in the eyes of the American
people).
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psychological and emotional benefits upon the parties. 143
These benefits may also come in the form of being able to
claim credit for helping to reach the compromise publicly,
which may help their personal reelection bids as well as
those of other lawmakers in their party.
Finally, Congress has supported ADR for federal
agencies since the late 1980s and already recognizes its
efficacy. 144 As early as 1986, The Administrative
Conference of the United States (“ACUS”) recommended
federal agencies to more fully adopt ADR in order to tackle
the backlog of disputes plaguing the agencies. 145 A year
before the recommendation, the U.S. Attorney General
issued an order to recognize ADR as a means of reducing the
costs of civil lawsuits. 146 Consequently, Congress passed
the Administrative Dispute Resolution Acts of 1990 and
1996 as well as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
1988.147 While focused on reducing the costs of litigation
for the federal agencies, the central themes of reducing cost,
increasing efficiency, and simplifying the process of
resolution are equally applicable to Congress through the
Mediation Office.
V.
Potential Objections
No solution is without its faults. With a proposal
for significant change, many objections are expected to arise.
In this section, I will raise a few and attempt to assuage these
concerns. Others not mentioned in this article will no doubt
have to be ironed out with time and experience if the
Mediation Office should come to light.
143

Greenberg & Blazina, supra note 81, at 212–13.
See U.S. OFF. PERS. MGMT., ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION HANDBOOK
1, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/employee-relations/employeerights-appeals/alternative-dispute-resolution/handbook.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,
2021).
145
ADMIN. CONF. U.S., AGENCIES’ USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (1986), https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/agencies-usealternative-means-dispute-resolution.
146
Id. at 1.
147
Id. Independent use of ADR began in the 1970s. Id.
144
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The first objection is the well-reasoned balking at
spending more taxpayer dollars. Our national deficit has
already ballooned to over $28 trillion, amounting to about
$86,025 per person if divided by our population. 148 The
three largest contributors to the rising national debt are our
aging population (who will incur more costs for their care
but contribute less labor), the rising cost of healthcare, and
insufficient tax revenue to enact the spending lawmakers put
into effect. 149 Currently, the recession induced by the
pandemic will likely generate more upward pressure on the
deficit. 150 A proposal that would require more spending
when the generated revenues cannot cover what is already
being spent seems to be somewhat circular reasoning. I
concede the point if the Mediation Office is created though
ultimately unsuccessful in its endeavors. However, if we are
to make a change as a nation, new solutions must be tried.
An easy method of accomplishing this would be to include a
sunset provision in the bill allowing it to die peacefully
should it prove unfruitful.151 While by no means a perfect
solution and the potential for more political haggling, a
predetermined end may ease the fears of skeptics.
Second, the sheer complexity of creating legislation
may be beyond a Mediation Office. Like Greenberg and
Blazina point out that mass tort litigation often brings high
numbers of claims whose factors are interdependent,
legislation too rests on numerous concerns, objections, and

148

What is the National Debt Today?, PETER G. PETERSON FOUNDATION
[hereinafter Debt Clock], https://www.pgpf.org/national-debt-clock (2021). If
one visits the website, they will continue to see the number climb. Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. (“The coronavirus crisis has accelerated an already unsustainable fiscal
trajectory, both because of its devastating effect on the economy and the
necessary legislative response.”).
151
Stephen R. Latham, Sunset Law, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/sunset-law (outlining the provision’s history
of use as well as some tactical advantages to be gained by using a sunset
provision).
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influences that all affect one other. 152 Even with high
complexity, a third-party neutral (in this case mediators)
may be able to use their outside perspective to parse the
underlying issues and break them down into more
manageable ones.153
Third, lawmakers may not tolerate a constriction of
their power in the legislative process to gain leverage or give
back to their constituents. One such prominent mechanism
is the dreaded pork barrel. Pork barreling is defined as
legislators trading favors with constituents or special interest
groups in exchange for political support.154 For example, a
legislator may vote to ease environmental restrictions in
exchange for campaign contributions from an oil company.
When the Mediation Office isolates the issues to be
hammered out that will inhabit a compromise bill, several
bargaining chips and interdependent issues that allow their
use could be taken out of play. While morally this may not
be a bad thing to see more honest legislative work being
done, because Congress makes the rules it is bound by, they
will not likely self-impose restrictions on the use of their
tools of the trade.155 However, were this restrictive force put
into play, it may motivate members of Congress to reach
solutions on their own without the help of mediation to avoid
restrictions. Plenty of other broad bills that do not cover
triggering categories will come before Congress, meaning
their opportunities to pork barrel will not disappear, just be
somewhat reduced. While some waste would be found in
152

Greenberg & Blazina, supra note 81, at 211.
Id.
154
What are Examples of Pork Barrel Politics in the United States?,
INVESTOPEDIA
(July
15,
2021)
[hereinafter
INVESTOPEDIA],
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042115/what-are-some-examplespork-barrel-politics-united-states.asp (noting several examples of wasteful
spending brought about by pork barrel politics).
155
INVESTOPEDIA, supra note 154 (noting the peak of pork barrel politics
wasting $30 billion on 14,000 pet projects). While Congress put a moratorium
on earmarking in 2010 (setting aside money for a specific purpose), pork
barreling still finds its way into politics. Id.
153
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the bill, the American people can at least more confidently
expect a functioning government. Finally, Congress may be
too averse to any limitation of their power to pass the
legislation creating the Mediation Office, or at least passing
it with the ability to work. I must concede this point as the
most likely to defeat the proposal. However, for Congress
to take a step forward, they must themselves be willing to do
so honestly.
Finally, there is a legitimate counterargument that
Congress need not heed constituents as much as this paper
may claim, given their “exceptionally high” reelection
rate. 156 Murse points out that several factors (such as
gerrymandering, name recognition, full campaign war chests,
and the franking privilege) work to firmly entrench
incumbents and ward off challengers.157 The ability to use
the pork barrel is another tool in an incumbent’s belt to win
constituent support for pet projects back home.158 While a
formidable objection, this paper’s proposal should not be
unduly deterred. As mentioned before, isolating the key
issues should reduce the opportunities to use the pork barrel
by focusing on those key issues at hand. 159 Additionally,
today’s pressures paint a similar picture to one of the few
times incumbents have been ousted en masse. Come 1938
in the middle of the Great Depression, desperate and
struggling Americans ousted eighty-one Democrats from
office during President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s midterm
election. 160 Given the desperate times created by the
pandemic, the stage may be set for a similar shakeup should

156

Murse, supra note 142; see INVESTOPEDIA, supra note 154 for a table
outlining the reelection rate of House members over the past several years
showing reelection to be more likely than not.
157
Murse, supra note 142.
158
Id.
159
See supra paragraph four of this section (Part V).
160
Murse, supra note 142.
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the situation not improve, meaning Congress may be more
willing to heed their constituents.161
VI.
Conclusion
When asked what the Founding Fathers had created
in the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin was
said to have replied, “[a] republic, if you can keep it.” 162
Beeman rightfully gleans from Franklin’s wisdom that our
Constitution “is neither self-actuating nor a self-correcting
document.”163 The disorder and deadlock we see today in
our Congress give evidence that while one can assemble the
collective wisdom of our representatives in the chambers of
Congress, Franklin was right in warning one assembles also
“their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their
local interests, and their selfish views.”164 When Professor
Marshall wrote his article calling for legal accountability for
congressional inaction, he was doing just as Franklin
prescribed, his part in keeping the republic. 165 While the
Constitution is the guidepost that holds our government
together, the government it created must change with the
times—and it has.166 Indeed, Congress is supposed to be a
slower, deliberative body, but it too can become stronger and
better. 167
Introducing mediation into Congress
accomplishes this goal without compromising the body’s
slow, deliberative nature envisioned by the Framers.
161

See supra note 6 and accompanying text. While admittedly the situation has
changed since the beginning of the pandemic, the fact that Americans are still
struggling has not.
162
Richard R. Beeman, Perspectives on the Constitution: A Republic, if You
Can
Keep
It,
NAT’L
CONST.
CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/learn/educational-resources/historicaldocuments/perspectives-on-the-constitution-a-republic-if-you-can-keep-it (last
visited Oct. 11, 2021).
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Marshall, supra note 7, at 168.
166
See Beeman, supra note 162 (using the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 19th
amendments as examples of the positive change that has made the Constitution
a “stronger, better document.”).
167
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Deliberation is certainly needed on key issues such as the
functioning of our government and in emergencies, though
deliberation should not sink into inaction and infighting.
Mediation brings about the best of both worlds by not
seeking to usurp congressional power, but by keeping
progress alive. By breaking the logjam, the benefits of our
democracy can again flow to the governed.
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